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1The market for scientific lemons, and the marketization of science&
(el mercado de los limones científicos y la mercantilización de la ciencia)
Jesús Zamora Bonilla*
UNED, España
aBSTraCT: Scientific research is based on the division of cognitive labour: every scientist has to trust 
that other colleagues have checked whether the items that are taken as knowledge, and she cannot check 
by herself, are reliable enough. I apply ideas from the field known as ‘information economics’ (the study 
of economic interactions where some agents are better informed than others) to analyse the scientists’ in-
centives to produce items of knowledge of an ‘adequate’ quality, under the assumption that a big part of 
what one observes in her empirical research is not available for the readers of the paper. I also discuss some 
criticisms to this ‘marketization’ of science studies.
KEYWOrDS: Division of cognitive labour; trust; rational choice; economics of information; informa-
tion asymmetry; scientific norms; scientific institutions; commodification.
resumen: La investigación científica se basa en la división del trabajo cognitivo: todo científico ha de con-
fiar en que otros colegas hayan comprobado que los ítems que son considerados como conocimiento y que no 
pueden ser comprobados por él mismo son suficientemente fiables. Aplico aquí ideas del campo conocido como 
«economía de la información» (el estudio de las interacciones económicas en las que algunos agentes están me-
jor informados que otros) para analizar los incentivos de los científicos para producir ítems de conocimiento de 
una calidad «adecuada», bajo el supuesto de que una gran parte lo que observan en su investigación empírica 
no está disponible para los lectores de un artículo. También discuto algunas críticas a la «mercantilización» 
de los estudios sobre la ciencia.
PALABrAS CLAve: división del trabajo cognitivo; confianza; elección racional; economía de la informa-
ción; asimetría de la información; normas científicas; instituciones científicas; mercantilización.
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1. The division of cognitive labour and the problem of trust in science
Science, as most activities in complex societies, is based on the division of labour, in par-
ticular, on the division of cognitive labour.12No individual scientist can check by herself 
most of the knowledge she ‘has’ of her field (not to mention knowledge about neigh-
bouring fields), but needs just to trust what is taken as ‘knowledge’ by her colleagues as 
actually known. Of course, every bit of ‘knowledge’ can turn out being false, and some 
researches may end establishing that some bit of past ‘knowledge’ has to be substituted 
for a new, different piece of it. But usually there is the need of accepting by default what 
the relevant community of experts has adopted as ‘correct information’. Every scientist 
belongs to at least one of these ‘communities of experts’, and this makes her responsi-
ble of doing her part of the task in assuring the rest of the scientists out of those small 
groups, as well as the rest of society, that some specific items of information are ‘reliable 
knowledge’.
The question is, what warrants that every scientist complies with this responsibility? 
Casual conversation with academics of any branch of science gives the impression that they 
tend to think that individual honesty is all that is required, and that, actually, science is trus-
tful mainly thanks to it. Even exposing them to an analysis or reasoning as the one I shall 
offer in section 2, it is received, at times, as a kind of insult... this has been at least my ex-
perience after two decades working on the ‘economics of scientific knowledge’. This fear 
to ‘selfishness’ is so intense, that some specialists in the social analysis of science worry that 
just performing that analysis with the help of rational choice theory (rCT) as a basic inte-
llectual tool (e.g., studying science ‘as if it were a market’) would have the risk of ‘contami-
nating’ the purity of science and contributing to its ‘marketization’; I shall examine some 
of these criticisms in the last part of my paper.2 On the other hand, recurrent complaints 
about the extent of fraud and other misconducts in some branches of science (E.g., Ioan-
nidis 2005; Fanelli 2009), or about the ‘replication’ or ‘reproducibility crisis’ (E.g., Nature 
2016), or about the excess of publications (E.g., Siebert et al. 2015), or about the dangers of 
an excessive privatisation of research (E.g., Laughlin 2008), make it clear that there is the 
feeling that trust in science must be guaranteed by some other procedures than naive resor-
ting to individual rectitude, for this rectitude flourishes more and better in some social, cul-
tural or institutional environments than in others. Lastly, we should mention that ‘science 
studies’ in the last fifty years have established beyond any reasonable doubt that scientific 
knowledge is often, if not always, the result of some kind of ‘negotiation’, or at least some 
kind of ‘social construction’, and, even if we prefer not to take it in a relativistic, or ‘too 
constructionist’ fashion, this entails that the public outcome of scientific research is not so-
mething that can be algorithmically derived from totally objective data, but something that 
is always open to some degree of interpretation, and that different scientists may have rea-
sons to prefer different interpretations and, hence, reasons to consider some possible outco-
mes as ‘better’ or ‘worse’.3
1 See Kitcher (1990) for a classic statement, and Weisberg (2017) for a recent summary.
2 For a general survey of the application of economic theoretic tools to the study of science in its epis-
temic aspects, see Zamora Bonilla (2011a).
3 See Chang (2004) for a clear, not relativist case.
https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.19508 135
The market for scientific lemons, and the marketization of science
In summary, ‘proper’ scientific conduct is essential to the credibility of scientific 
knowledge, but why scientists actually behave in such a ‘proper’ way, and how they end 
defining and implementing that way, is something that cannot be taken for granted 
but that needs explanation. My goal in this short paper, however, is not to offer a full 
fledged theory explaining ‘why science works’, but to propose a couple of insights that 
may help us advance in the direction I think is most promissory. I will make use of rCT 
(after all, is it not a nice minimal default assumption that scientists are rational agents?), 
and in particular of one of its most (theoretically and empirically) successful applica-
tions in the social sciences: the tool known as the economics of information (EI) (See 
Birchler and Bütler 2007). Contrarily to the standard microeconomic models applied 
to cases like perfect competition or perfect monopoly, EI assumes that different agents 
may have different information sets (mainly because information is not usually free, 
but more or less costly to acquire and to master), and it explores the consequences this 
asymmetry has under different contexts or institutional arrangement (i.e., ‘markets’). EI 
is particularly important in any attempt to apply rCT outside its classical field of eco-
nomics, because it makes it explicit that analysing a social situation in terms of ‘a mar-
ket’ does not entails that everything in that social context works automatically towards 
an optimal outcome ‘as if lead by an invisible hand’ thanks to the agents’ selfishness (to 
use the famous Adam Smith’s metaphor). rather on the contrary: some ‘markets’ can 
work indeed quite badly, and this can justify some kind of ‘public intervention’, even 
if this consists in a group of agents collectively deciding to modify the institutional ar-
rangement that is causing their problems. So, an economics-of-information analysis of 
science is not necessarily a ‘pro-market’ approach in any problematic sense of the ‘mar-
ket’ metaphor.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a toy model of the 
‘market for scientific papers’, inspired in one of the founding pieces of the EI literature: 
George Akerlof’s ‘The Market for Lemons’ (1970). The model is not assumed to offer a 
detailed, nor even an empirically adequate view of how the production of scientific pa-
pers actually goes on. Instead, as models usually do in social sciences, its goal is to help us 
‘isolate’ (cf., e.g,. Mäki 2009) some ‘essential’ factors that may play an important role in 
the relevant processes, even if in the actual world those factors are to some extent ‘neu-
tralised’ in order to avoid its possible pernicious consequences, or work in conjunction 
with other factors that help disguise the formers’ distinctive effects. Section 3 will take 
advantage of some of the conclusions of the previous one, and will turn to a more general 
discussion about the possible connections between a market-like analysis of the produc-
tion of scientific knowledge, on the one hand, and the ‘marketization’ of science, on the 
other. In order not to make the discussion too lengthy, I shall concentrate in discussing 
one recent and scrupulous criticism of both types of ‘marketization’, Ylva Hasselberg’s 
paper “Demand or discretion? The market model applied to science and its core values 
and institutions” (2012), though I shall also refer of course to some other authors.
2. The market for ‘scientific lemons’.
Akerlof’s ‘Market for Lemons’ presents an idealised model of the market for used cars, in 
which sellers know the real quality of each car, but buyers are not able to distinguish both 
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types of cars before buying them and using them for a time. The price buyers are willing to 
pay for good used cars (‘peaches’) is higher than the one they would pay for bad ones (‘lem-
ons’), but, being not capable of noticing the difference between both types of cars in the lot, 
the clients would be willing to pay a price for every car which is equal to the weighted aver-
age of what they would pay for good and bad ones (the weights being equal to the known 
or estimated proportion of each kind). This price would be not accepted by sellers for good 
cars, for it is lower that these cars’ ‘real’ value, and hence, sellers will have an incentive to 
sell only bad cars, ‘lemons’. Of course, clients, knowing this, will only offer their price for 
bad cars. The asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers (their different degree 
of knowledge about the real quality of each single car) will have created, in this way, what 
in EI literature is called an ‘adverse selection’ problem: the market works in such a way that 
it only ‘selects’ the bad items.
Akerlof’s paper didn’t claim that the market for used cars actually worked in the way 
his model depicted. Even, the concept of ‘used cars’ (or ‘lemons’) is employed in the pa-
per not as literally referring to those specific goods, but as an illustration of any type 
of exchange in which the parts happen to have different information about what is ex-
changed. Akerlof explicitly mentions the labour markets, insurance markets, as well as 
underdeveloped economies and ‘the cost of dishonesty’, as other examples about which 
his theory could offer some useful insight. In a sense, what I shall try to do in this section 
is to include the process of creation of a scientific paper in the set of possible applications 
of Akerlof’s scheme (if not strictly of his model, since in the case I shall examine there are 
no ‘prices’).
The information asymmetry in the ‘market for lemons’ is about the intrinsic qual-
ity of a material good: sellers know the cars better than buyers. Does something similar 
occur in the case of science? I think it is reasonable to claim that, because of the ‘divi-
sion of cognitive labour’ we have mentioned at the beginning, the author of a scientific 
paper unavoidable knows much more than her typical reader about the work that has 
been carried out in order to elaborate the text (let’s consider, e.g., one paper that re-
ports a laboratory experiment or field observation, or that uses these as arguments in fa-
vour of a conjecture, theory, etc.). If the mythical, naïve positivist view of ‘the scientific 
method’ were right, there would be an algorithmic procedure to ‘translate’ the results of 
the experiments/observations into a text, so that the ‘final’ paper would simply become 
a transparent description of ‘the facts’. But every working scientist, as well as every his-
torian, philosopher or sociologist of science worth his salt, knows that in the real world 
things are much more complicated. The paper necessarily offers just a selection, or sum-
mary, or interpretation (or all of it), of the empirical results and the steps that have 
been taken. The claim of the paper (either a ‘description’ of the results, or a conjecture 
supported by them) is one, but in principle it could have been different if a different in-
terpretation or use of the results had been made. Papers that have been co-authored 
(as most of them are in experimental science) show still more clearly that this ‘space of 
possibilities’ exists, because in this case co-authors ‘negotiate’ the specific content and 
claims that will be included in the final text (cf. Knorr-Cetina 1981). And in many 
cases, ‘negotiations’ between authors, referees, and editors can also be understood as 
attempts to make more congenial the content of the paper with standard ideas or 
practices within the discipline, or to disclose a little bit more of what the author has 
kept ‘concealed’ in the article’s first versions (See, e.g., Gosden 2003; García et al. 
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2017).The process of writing of a scientific paper partly consists, hence, in choosing one 
text from a set of possible texts, all of these more or less ‘justifiable’ by the empirical re-
sults obtained by the authors. The relevant information asymmetry here lies in the fact 
that, in principle, the authors know the whole set of possibilities (what they ‘could have 
claimed’ given their results), but the readers only know just one of the possibilities, the one 
that has been chosen by the authors; i.e., the typical reader basically ignores what other 
papers the authors could have written using the same results. I insist: the ‘results’ them-
selves are hidden for the readers, for it is only the specific description/interpretation of 
the results what they get from the published paper. Naturally, one of the basic points of 
science is that these results must be reproducible, but ‘replication’ necessarily consists, 
at most, in producing a new, different set of results, whose description/interpretation will 
be assessed in order to see whether it can be considered as coherent or incoherent with 
the original published report.
Figure 1
rCT can be employed at this point to illuminate the scientist’s (or author’s) decision of 
choosing one particular way of expressing her results. The cloud of points H in fig. 1 rep-
resents the possible articles (or ‘hypotheses’) she might write on the basis of those same re-
sults. Our first question is, what different properties or qualities each option has, so that some 
of them are ‘better’ from the point of view of our scientist? In order to keep the complexity 
of my argument at a minimal level, I will discuss only two of those qualities: the degree in 
which the scientist thinks one possible interpretation will resist future criticisms, and the 
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degree in which she thinks the interpretation is original or innovative. I shall call these two 
properties ‘plausibility’ and ‘novelty’ respectively; they are measured respectively by the hor-
izontal and vertical axes. I will also make the simplifying assumption that every member of 
the relevant scientific community, i.e., all the potential readers of the paper our scientist is 
to write, would agree with her on the values of these two qualities for each possible inter-
pretation if it were the chosen one. A couple of variables that may work as proxies for plau-
sibility and novelty are the posterior and prior probabilities of the claim made in the paper, 
i.e., p(h/eh&B) and p(h/B), where h ∈ H is the claim, eh is the offered description of the 
empirical results if h is chosen, and B is all relevant background knowledge shared by the 
scientific community.
One important feature of the set H is that its ‘frontier’ in the upper right side of the 
graph will very likely have a negative slope. This simply means that, though the author 
may choose interpretations with a higher or lower value of each two epistemic variables, 
at some point it must be the case that improvements in one of the qualities (e.g., finding 
out a more plausible claim) can only be attained at the cost of decreasing the other qual-
ity (i.e., making it less innovative). The author might want to be capable of devising a pa-
per that were better in both regards, but her results do not allow such an utopian accom-
plishment.
A second question is, how these values affect the author’s optimal choice? This will 
depend on the expected decision that readers will make about the paper. Simplifying 
again a lot, when one possible interpretation is made public, readers have two possible 
reactions: either accepting it or rejecting it. If the paper’s claim is rejected, the author 
gets a utility of 0. If it is accepted, it is reasonable to assume that the author’s utility ba-
sically depends on how ‘important’ the claim seems, and this will directly depend on its 
degree of novelty. Hence, a preliminary question for the author is to make a distinction 
between those h’s that will be accepted and those that will not. Assuming (again with a 
great dose of idealisation and simplification) that she shares with all her colleagues the 
disciplinary criteria about when are papers ‘good enough’ to become acceptable, the au-
thor will directly know the answer to this question just by being a member of her dis-
cipline. It seems reasonable to assume that these criteria depend on the two epistemic 
factors we have mentioned: plausibility and novelty; ‘good papers’ are those that have 
a sufficiently high degree of both qualities, with some room for higher degrees of one 
compensating, to some extent, lower degrees of the other. This entails that the epis-
temic indifference curves for the readers will be decreasing and convex,4 and represent-
ing a higher utility level as they are further away from the origin of the graph, as de-
picted in fig. 2. This figure also shows a thicker curve (UL) that is defined by being the 
lowest utility level the discipline has to get from one paper for it to become ‘acceptable’; 
hence, this represents the acceptability threshold: claims worse than that are rejected, 
and claims above the line are accepted.
4 Convexity means that a linear combination of two points x, y in the graph which are equally preferred 
(i.e., a point z lying on the straight line joining x and y) is necessarily preferred to each of them, i.e., 
U(z) > U(x) = U(y).
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Figure 2
Knowing all this, our author’s choice is already determined: the best choice for her is to se-
lect the interpretation that is both over UL and that has the maximum possible novelty, i.e., 
the claim h’ of fig. 2. However, as it is also clear from the figure, it can easily be the case that 
h’ is not the paper that readers would have preferred if they had known all the possibilities, 
for their best choice (in the case depicted in the figure) would have been h*, i.e., the ele-
ment of H which lies in their highest possible utility curve, UM. Stated differently: the exis-
tence of asymmetric information entails that the author’s optimum may not coincide with the 
community’s optimum. Under the idealised and simplified conditions depicted in my argu-
ment, the members of a scientific community will tend to produce papers that are not epistemi-
cally optimal from the point of view of their own epistemic criteria.
As it was the case with Akerlof’s paper, my analysis does not attempt to proof that this 
is an empirically accurate description of the process of writing and accepting scientific pa-
pers. It only identifies a tension that exists between the different interests of scientists de-
pending on whether they are acting in their role of authors or in the role of readers. The 
main insight that can be gained thanks to looking at the creation of scientific knowledge 
from this viewpoint is that some scientific institutions or practices can be seen as attempts 
to resolve this tension (i.e., to persuade authors to select an interpretation of their results 
which is closer to the community’s optimum), or, instead, as factors that can end giving au-
thors more freedom to select papers that are epistemically ‘too bad’. In the positive side we 
can mention institutions like peer review, that tends to downgrade the authors’ claims and 
to demand stronger justification for them, (Gosden 2003) the existence of different journals 
of different average quality, i.e., with different UL thresholds in the sense of fig. 2, etc. In the 
negative side we find some of the problems mentioned in section 1: lack of incentives to 
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replicate findings, excessive pressure for publishing, etc. In particular, a higher probability 
that the results are not externally checked tends to enlarge the set H of possible interpreta-
tions of the empirical results in the direction of the vertical axis, namely, including strong 
claims that are apparently but not really ‘justified’ by the actual results.
3. The marketization of science and the ‘marketization’ of science studies
One can criticise arguments and models like the one I have offered in the past section 
on basically two different types of grounds. In the first place, one can argue that this or 
other similar model is too simple, or too idealised, or not simple enough, or that it fails to 
include some relevant variables or some type of interactions between agents, or that the 
type of ‘market’ or ‘rules’ assumed in the model are very far from how the ‘market for sci-
entific papers’ really words. These criticisms would not dispute that it can be reasonable 
to analyse the decisions of scientists, as well as the outcomes of these decisions, in terms 
of rational choice theory or, more precisely, with game-theoretic tools; they only would 
suggest that a particular market-like analysis of scientific research could certainly be im-
proved in many ways. But in the second place, one can make an overall amendment to 
the idea of studying the process of scientific research in a similar way as theoretical econ-
omists study markets and other social institutions. One reason put at times to justify this 
general criticism is the claim that the ‘new economics of science’ or ‘economics of scien-
tific knowledge’ (as this type of analysis are often known) (Cf., e.g., Ballandonne 2012; 
Fernández Pinto 2016) is simply an ideological henchman of the general political trend 
towards the privatisation of public services in general and of scientific research in partic-
ular, a neoliberal rhetorical strategy to persuade scientists, politicians and the public that 
science can be controlled through economic handles as almost anything else within soci-
ety. Historian of economics Philip Mirowski is one particularly clear voice in criticising 
what he sees as
a fundamental fallacy: that “science” can and should be subject to the very same analytical prac-
tices (what they engagingly call tools) that they have applied to any other commodity or situation 
– in other words, there is nothing particularly special about science (... Instead,) scientific research 
is above all a process that has to remain open to the serendipitous, the unexpected, the incongru-
ous, and the unanticipated. (Mirowski 2011, 391)
There are two serious mistakes in a criticism like this one. First, an economic or game-the-
oretic analysis of the creation of scientific knowledge does not necessarily lead to a ‘neolib-
eral’ economics of science or science policy. rather on the contrary, it may lead (as it has 
been precisely the case in the model I have offered in the past section) to the identification 
of ‘market failures’ whose solution demands some type of public or collective manage-
ment, perhaps because of fundamental uncertainties of the kind suggested by Mirowski; 
or even, it may be totally separate from questions about science policy properly under-
stood (speaking for myself, I can say that my main use of economic tools in ‘science stud-
ies’ has been to discuss some epistemological questions, not political or managerial ones). 
Second, applying the formal apparatus of game-theory to some field does not amount 
to assume that the field has ‘nothing peculiarly special’; it is, instead, the attempt to see 
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whether and how the special aspects of the field can be illuminated by considering them 
from the point of view of game-theory. Of course, this does not entail that the insights 
gained from the use of this formal tool are so powerful and accurate that any other type 
of analysis can be dispensed with. Game-theory, as any other social science paradigm, has 
its own methodological and substantial limitations, and any other different kind of study 
that complements its multiple gaps or remedy its unavoidable shortcomings will naturally 
be welcome.
But the paper I would like to concentrate on, since I think it is one of the clear-
est examples of the type of criticisms mentioned above, is Ylva Hasselberg’s “De-
mand or discretion? The market model applied to science and its core values and in-
stitutions” (2012). Hasselberg laments that substituting ‘the economic logic of the 
market’ for what she calls ‘scientific judgment-driven rationality’, i.e., considering sci-
entists as neoclassical agents, would lead to loose the fundamental characteristic of 
scientists’ judgment, which is not algorithmic or deductive, but based on qualitative, con-
text-dependent reasons, and governed by discretion (what she defines as taking into ac-
count “what is perceived to be good, correct, or even beautiful” p. 37), always according to 
professional, intersubjective values and norms. It is not only the way scientists make deci-
sions what would change were they to be ‘neoclassical agents’, but also their own goals, for 
economic theory depicts individuals as pursuing just their own private benefit or self-inter-
est, instead of ‘collective cultural values’ such as truth, for example. This could lead, accord-
ing to Hasselberg, to the commodification of science:
Commodification means (1) that the relationships that surround a commodity are transformed 
into market relationships and (2) that exchange value or market value will take priority to all other 
kinds of value. Work that does not contribute to market value is meaningless. Knowledge that can-
not be transformed into a marketable product with a market value is also meaningless. (p. 40)
This ‘commodification’ would happen because, if economic rationality takes the place of 
scientific judgment, science would be governed by a type of ‘recognition capitalism’ as the 
one classically depicted by French sociologists like Bourdieu, Callon or Latour (See, e.g., 
Latour 1987). Under such a regime, the production of scientific papers would just respond 
to the demand and supply forces determined by the search for recognition and by the costs 
of the different strategies. In such a market, the scientist
wants to exchange as little knowledge as possible for as much cultural and economic capital [i.e., 
recognition and research resources] as possible (…) Demand replaces discretion as an ulterior mo-
tive for producing knowledge. Knowledge that is not in demand will not be produced. It also 
means that there is no driving force towards procuring as much knowledge as possible (...) The 
scientist on the market does not care for knowledge in itself. values as well as emotions are ex-
ternal to the market model, and if they come into the picture they possibly create disturbances or 
market imperfections. (p. 44)
Furthermore,
texts will tend to lose their use value and retain only their exchange value. The main point is that 
reading becomes instrumental and shallow (…) The knowledge base necessary for intersubjectiv-
ity will be diminished (...) The supply–demand mechanism will tend to downplay discretionary 
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decision making and shift focus from the text as a means of communicating the result to the text 
as a commodity on a market of publication (...) In the neoclassical model of science, only scientific 
development that leads to a text that can be marketed is desirable, assessable, or even possible to 
discover. Ideas and thoughts, no matter how brilliant they are, are not marketable. (p. 49)
In summary, if science became a market, the ‘traditional’ cycle of production of knowledge, 
that according to Hasselberg was ‘article-recognition-article’ (i.e., recognition as a means to 
the production of knowledge), would be replaced by a ‘capitalist’ cycle of the ‘recognition-
article-recognition’ type (i.e., one in which knowledge is produced just as a means to at-
tain recognition), where knowledge that is valuable for its own epistemic merits would no 
longer be pursued, nor even recognised as valuable.
To these claims, I think we can respond with the following arguments. In the first 
place, we have to make a clear and emphatic distinction between the theoretical instru-
ments of the analysis of science, on the one hand, and the real psychological or institutional 
features of the people and groups involved in real scientific practice. Understanding science 
‘as if it were a market’ needs not change real science more than what understanding the re-
production of ants ‘as if it were a market’ would change the sexual behaviour of ants. The 
case is clearer if our object of study is not contemporary science but some historical episode. 
Would Hasselberg and the other critics of the economics of scientific knowledge really be-
lieve that absolutely no insight can be gained about, say, the history of the Scientific revolu-
tion by viewing its protagonists as engaged in some types of ‘games’ or ‘epistemic markets’? 
Furthermore, even if being exposed to some rational-choice analysis of their own practice 
would lead some real scientists to change to some extent their values and strategies, it is by 
no means clear that this change would necessarily be in the direction towards a ‘commodi-
fication’ of science and towards loosing the good-old-fashion scientific values praised by 
Hasselberg (and, if it is, what if scientists know better?).
In the second place, it is a fundamental miscomprehension of rational choice theoretic 
analysis to assume that it is based on a selfish calculation of egoistic preferences instead as 
on cultural norms or something like that. rationality, in the sense of ‘utility maximisa-
tion’, only means that we make the assumption that the agents behave as if they were try-
ing to maximally satisfy a coherent system of preferences, no matter what these preferences 
are: they can be ‘selfish’, or they can be as ‘communitarian’ or ‘institutional’ as we want.5 
If real scientists have an interest in the pursuit of truth and understanding, our goal as stu-
dents of science would be to determine the real strength of this interest in their overall 
system of preferences and motivations, not to fool ourselves by imagining that they only 
pursue ‘noble’ goals. Neither have we to interpret rational choice theory as assuming that 
the agents’ ‘decision process’ reduces to a mathematical optimisation calculus; the theory 
is in itself agnostic about the psychological mechanisms that lead agents to their decisions, 
5 Cf., Sen (1991). A referee of a previous version of this paper justly complied that I had only considered 
‘rationality’ in the sense of rational choice theory, and that other views of rationality are common in 
the social sciences. This is true, of course, but it is just an unavoidable consequence of my paper’s main 
goal: to present a rational choice model of the production of scientific paper, and to defend its meth-
odology from some criticisms that I consider not appropriate, like Mirowski’s and Hasselberg’s. For 
any reader interested in the more general question of the different senses of rationality in the social sci-
ences, I have discussed it in more detail the topic in Zamora Bonilla (2011b).
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and these mechanisms can be as ‘discretionary’ or ‘judgmental’ as we please; the only as-
sumption rational choice theory makes (and very probably a very simplified and only ap-
proximate one) is that the outcome of every decision will be ‘optimal’ from the point of 
view of the agent’s preferences and values, i.e., that when they discover that they could do 
something that leads to a better result, they do it (though optimality not necessarily arises 
at the collective level if there are ‘collective action problems’, i.e., if the ‘games’ do not lead 
to a socially efficient outcome; it can also be that individuals fail to find the optimal strat-
egy due to rationality limits, but this can also be studied by means of ‘economic’ models) 
(see, e.g., Mallard 2015).
In the third place, it is also a mistake to assume that an economic analysis leaves neces-
sarily outside anything that has to do with ‘social norms’. rather on the contrary, rational 
choice and game-theoretic analysis can serve to illuminate the emergence of some norms, 
and to clarify the virtues and defects of real or possible rules. Furthermore, usually an eco-
nomic analysis cannot even start in a ‘normative vacuum’, for it always presupposes some 
normative frame or another (for example, property rights, government power, etc.). In par-
ticular, economics of information is one branch of economics specifically devoted to ex-
plain the emergence and working of some institutions, and even to design them (see, e.g., 
Gintis 2009).
In the fourth place, economic analysis does not always assume that social institutions 
work ‘as a market’. rather on the contrary, it can also try to explain why in some cases eco-
nomic agents prefer to carry out certain activities out of the market. One classical example 
of this is ronald Coase’s theory of the firm (Coase 1937), since the capitalist company is 
typically an institution that competes within a market but that does not internally work ac-
cording to market rules, but according to bureaucratic organisation and hierarchical values. 
These may not be the same values typical of science, of course, but there is nothing that pre-
vents an economic-type explanation of why scientific research follows very different proce-
dures and norms than the ones we find in the markets for typical economic goods.
Fifth: even if epistemic values like ‘truth’ or ‘knowledge’, on the one hand, and ‘pri-
vate’ values like ‘recognition’ have to be included as different variables in the scientists’ 
utility function, this does not necessarily mean that the latter are totally independent 
from the former. After all, recognition is not ‘mere recognition’, but intrinsically con-
sists in ‘recognition for something’. Even a totally ‘cynical’ researcher, in the sense that 
she didn’t care at all about the epistemic value of her discoveries, would try to get really 
important results if their colleagues attribute a higher level of recognition to this type of 
findings. And a group of persons who were totally indifferent to the value of knowledge 
would probably find many other activities much more appealing and gratifying than bor-
ing scientific research, like people who don’t love physical exercise and the glory of be-
ing champion would hardly become athletes. The toy agents depicted in models like the 
one I have presented in the past section are, in this sense, not so different from the idea 
H asselberg has of real scientists.
Sixth, and last: even if you are afraid of the ‘commodification’ of science, applying 
‘market’ ideas may turn out being a better strategy for you than just mourning for the loss 
of the good old days when science was a romantic enterprise. The reason is that competi-
tive markets are in themselves an extraordinary force of innovation, and tend to dissolve 
the conservative forces that try to keep intact the existing spheres of power. These include 
economic entities like big corporations (that try to obtain excessive returns from their in-
Jesús Zamora Bonilla
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vestment thanks to patents and patent laws, for example), but also intellectual monopolies, 
like ‘paradigms’, ‘schools’ or any other type of dominant groups within science (Cf. Boldrin 
and Levine 2008). Adherence to ‘community values’ may often be just a rhetorical way to 
restrain innovation and to hamper the development or transmission of new, revolutionary 
ideas. Transforming the institutions of science so that less ‘orthodox’ ideas can flow more 
freely might serve to discover more quickly the ‘anomalies’ of the old paradigms. Probably 
the necessary institutional reforms should not lead to a kind of science as the ‘commodi-
fied’ one castigated by Hasselberg, Mirowski and others, but it’s difficult to imagine how 
could we scrutinize the workings of different alternative scenarios if we are not guided by 
some economic-like ideas about the rational behaviour of scientists under each possible set 
of circumstances.
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